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In this thesis, we study the price and income elasticities of gasoline demand in the different 
regions of Sweden. By collecting data for each region in the period between 2002-2017 we try 
to derive these elasticities. The purpose of this is to contribute to the understanding of the 
distributional effect in Sweden when the gasoline price increases. We expected higher price 
elasticities in absolute values in the more urban regions, and lower price elasticities in the more 
rural regions. Lower income elasticities were also expected to be found in regions with 
relatively high income, while higher income elasticities would be found in the regions with 
relatively low income. The estimates derived for each region do not confirm these patterns. 
However, when instead estimating the elasticities for groups of regions (according to their 
population densities), the price elasticities found are in expected ranges. The income elasticities 
that are found are still partly counterintuitive though. We discuss our results and provide some 
research avenues for better estimation. 
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1. Introduction 
The transport sector stands for roughly a third of all the emissions of greenhouse gases in 
Sweden. Of this total, the road traffic stood for around 93% in 2017 (Ekonomifakta, 2019). To 
reduce this, multiple instruments have been used, with the most acknowledged one perhaps 
being fuel taxes. One thing that fuel taxes intuitively imply are higher prices on fuel. However, 
there are other things that follow with fuel taxes that may not be as straight forward. One of 
these things is the impact higher fuel prices have on the individual’s wallet. 
While higher fuel taxes are easily motivated by environmental reasons, the implication of higher 
prices affects people differently. People who are dependent on fuel to get through their everyday 
life will most likely be more affected than people who are not. People who live in rural areas, 
who are dependent on their cars to get to work, school or just to buy groceries, will probably 
have less flexibility if the prices on fuel goes up.  
In Sweden, there are huge differences in the rurality of each region. These differences make it 
hard ignore how increased fuel prices impacts the people in different regions. This thesis focus 
on gasoline demand and to understand how this demand response in different regions to a price 
increase. This is essential to understand when discussing higher fuel taxes.  
This leads us to our research question, “Does the price and income elasticities of gasoline 
demand differ between the regions of Sweden?”. By deriving price and income elasticities for 
each region, we can potentially see how sensitive the gasoline demand in each region is to a 
price increase and an income increase respectively. We remarked that there is a lack of studies 
on elasticities of gasoline at the regional level in Sweden. This thesis will try to estimate these 
elasticities, to give a clearer view of how people are affected depending on which region they 
live in. 
By using data from the period 2002-2017, we run several OLS-regressions to derive the 
elasticities. Our results do not show the expected patterns that we establish according to 
economic theory and earlier studies. While this could imply that Sweden is an irregularity, we 
comment throughout the thesis how the study could have been improved. 
The thesis will be structured as following: Section 2 will give a quick background on the regions 
of Sweden. Section 3 is a review of earlier literature relevant to our research question. In section 
4, the relevant economic theory will be described, as well as our derived hypotheses. Section 5 
is where our data is described. Section 6 describes the method we have used to derive our 
results. Section 7 shows the results with following discussions and Section 8 states conclusions. 
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2. Context 
Regions  
There are 21 regions in Sweden. The division is illustrated in Figure 1. Each region has its own 
government, which is called “regionfullmäktige”. The regions have many responsibilities, 
though only four that are mandatory. These are healthcare, dentalcare, regional development 
and public transport (SKL, 2019).  
The 21 regions differ in many ways, from the 
geographic circumstances (e.g. north or south) to 
population density. While Stockholm is a rather small 
region, it had a population density of 353 
inhabitants/km2 (2017 data). This considerably 
contrasts with the region of Norrbotten, which had a 
population density of 2.6 inhabitants/km2. The regions 
also differ in terms of the average disposable income 
per household, where Stockholm once again had the 
highest of 242 000 SEK in the year 2017. By contrast, 
the regions of Gotland, Blekinge and Örebro had the 
lowest disposable income per household, with 197 000 
SEK in the same year (SCB, 2019). 
Another important difference between the regions is 
public transport. Each region’s government chooses the 
public transport supplier, which they finance with 
public funds (SKL, 2019). For example, the region of 
Västra Götaland has Västtrafik for public transport 
supplier (Västra Götalandsregionen, 2019), while the 
region of Skåne has Skånetrafik as supplier (Region Skåne, 2019). 
These differences might affect the elasticities of gasoline in each region, which would imply 
that the regions differ in their response to a price change of gasoline. The most important factors 
according to us, would be population density, income and availability of substitutes to gasoline 
(e.g. public transport). The fact that it is the region’s government that chooses public transport 
supplier, we can motivate our choice to study regions specifically. How the suppliers handle 
the public transport in their region, can influence people’s decisions when deciding to travel 
with public transport or not. Important factors when deciding if one will travel public, may be 
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e.g. the price of traveling public compared to taking your own car, how many departures there 
are per day or simply the quality of the rides. 
3. Literature Review 
3.1 Elasticities of gasoline 
There is plenty of literature on the subject of price elasticities of gasoline. With the large amount 
of studies, it is not strange that there is also an equally large amount of different results. Several 
reviews of this body of literature summarize earlier results. 
Dahl and Sterner (1991) summarize over a hundred studies’ results in a meta-analysis about 
gasoline demand and comment on the different kinds of methods to estimate gasoline demand 
elasticities. They find that even though many studies have contradictory results, this would be 
natural due to e.g. the many different models, types of data, countries, time periods and 
econometric methods that are used. They make some important distinctions between models. 
One is that different models capture different elasticities. While dynamic models capture both 
a short and long run elasticity, static models seem to capture some sort of intermediate run 
elasticity. Short run elasticities measure adjustments up to a year depending on what data is 
used, while long run elasticities measure the total adjustment which could take several years. 
At the end of their meta-analysis they note that the short run price elasticity of gasoline seems 
to be between -0.22 to -0.31, while the long run price elasticity seems to be between -0.8 to -
1.01. They also find that the short run income elasticity appears to be between 0.44 and 0.52, 
while the long run income elasticity is between 1.10 and 1.31 (Dahl & Sterner, 1991). 
In a similar survey, Graham and Glaister (2002) comment on the effect of different kinds of 
methods and types of data on results. Their meta-analysis show that short run price elasticities 
of gasoline tend to be around -0.3 and long run elasticities between -0.6 and -0.8. They also 
find short run income elasticities between 0.35 and 0.55 and long run income elasticities 
between 1.1 and 1.3. In their conclusions, they point out that higher prices do make a difference 
in gasoline consumption, especially in the long run, but it is not a proportional effect (Graham 
& Glaister, 2002). 
Sterner (2012) note that there is a consensus in previous literature that the long run price 
elasticity of fuel tends to be around -0.8 and the long run income elasticity tends to be around 
unity. The short run equivalents tend to be about a third of the long runs. But Sterner (2012) 
emphasize that the price elasticities of fuel may differ between countries. While fuel demand is 
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mostly determined by price and income, a country’s taxes, fees and other policies that affect 
the transport sector might play a big role in this difference in elasticities (Sterner, 2012). 
3.2 Elasticities of gasoline in specific countries 
In this subsection, we provide a short review of earlier estimates of gasoline elasticities. 
Following papers have studied specific countries, which gives us a better view of how different 
circumstances can create heterogeneity in elasticities.  
As Sterner (2012) noted, the elasticities in different countries vary greatly. For example, 
Hughes, Knittel and Sperling (2008) derive the short run price elasticity of gasoline in the U.S. 
They use aggregated monthly data and different models for two periods, 1975-1980 and 2001-
2006. They find short run elasticities between -0.21 and -0.34 in the first period and between -
0.034 and -0.077 in the second period. With these results, they draw the conclusion that people 
have become more insensitive to price changes now relative to previous decades. By 
interpreting this as evidence for structural changes in the U.S market for transportation fuel, 
they emphasize the implications this could have for policy making in the future (Hughes et al., 
2008).  
Baranzini and Weber (2012) uses quarterly data to study the price elasticity of gasoline in 
Switzerland, during the period 1970-2008. They find the price elasticity to be -0.09 in the short 
run and -0.34 in the long run. The small price elasticities that is found could according to 
Baranzini and Weber (2012) be explained by high incomes and low gasoline prices. They also 
find a long run income elasticity at 0.67 and a short run income elasticity at 0.025.  (Baranzini 
& Weber, 2012). 
Pyddoke and Swärdh (2015) study how the use of privately-owned cars varies in Sweden during 
the period 1999-2008 due to multiple factors, including fuel price. Their results show that the 
car travel elasticity of fuel prices is between -0.2 and -0.4 in the short run and between -0.3 and 
-0.6 in the long run. Overall, they note that car travel is rather inelastic since it is below unity. 
Pyddoke and Swärdh (2015), like Baranzini and Weber (2012), explain this low elasticity with 
the fact that car travel takes up such a small part of one’s total income. They also derive income 
elasticities of car travel, which shows to be fairly lower than other studies’ results. The short 
run income elasticities are reported to be between 0.01 and 0.07, while the long run income 
elasticities are between 0.15 and 0.2 (Pyddoke & Swärdh, 2015).  
Aklilu (2016) notes in a working paper that studies about different countries may not be 
comparable due to their differences in methods and data. He instead, study the elasticities of 
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both gasoline and total fuel in the EU-28 countries at once. The data is collected from the period 
1978-2013, but not all countries had data available from these years, so for these countries the 
period is shorter. Aklilu (2016) finds that both the short run and the long run price elasticity of 
gasoline varies in the EU. The short run elasticity varies between -0.005 in Spain to -0.58 in 
Romania, while the long run price elasticity varies between -0.04 in Malta to -1.96 in Sweden. 
On average, the short run price elasticity in the EU-28 countries are found to be -0.17 and in 
the long run -0.72. Aklilu (2016) also finds a great variation of the income elasticities in the 
EU-28. The lowest short run income elasticity is found in Spain, which is estimated at 0.018. 
This is while the highest is estimated to be 1.32 in Lithuania. The lowest long run income 
elasticity is -0.12 in Belgium, while the highest is found in Germany at 6.49. The average short 
run income elasticity is 0.45 and the average in the long run is 1.44 (Aklilu, 2016). 
3.3 Distributional effects of a higher gasoline price 
The objective of this thesis is to try to find elasticities of the different regions of Sweden. If the 
elasticities of the different regions vary from one another, there could be serious policy 
implications. As the literature shows, we have reason to believe that these differences exist. 
Larsson and Sandin (2018) study the effects of a tax raise on emissions from gasoline and diesel 
in Sweden. While they find that a tax raise reduces emissions, which gives significant 
environmental gains, the increase in the societal welfare is limited. They find negative 
distributional effects, which is partly due to the fact that rural areas are more affected than urban 
areas by a tax increase. Further, they also find that the social welfare gains of a tax increase are 
larger in cities than in rural areas. These results make fuel taxes challenging to implement. In 
their recommendations, they call for more studies on other policies than taxes that affects traffic 
more specifically in cities, policies like parking fees e.g. (Larsson & Sandin, 2018). 
Sterner (2012) agrees with the statement that fuel taxes reduce emissions. He even goes as far 
as saying that it is one of the most efficient tools to achieve a lower level of emissions. Although 
fuel taxes may have been implemented mostly for fiscal reasons and less for environmental 
ones, the effect surely is both. A common argument against fuel taxes that Sterner (2012) 
mentions is that they tend to be regressive. While taxing a good that is mainly used by the 
wealthier would be progressive, taxing a good that is mainly used by the poor is regressive. In 
this question, Sterner (2012) makes the conclusion that fuel taxes tend to be progressive in low 
income countries and regressive in high income countries (Sterner, 2012). 
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Sterner (2007) makes an interesting point. If a fuel tax is such a great instrument, why is it not 
used more universally? It may be because policy makers and politicians do not believe in 
climate change or simply because of lobbying. Policies are not always adopted to maximize 
welfare or to favour the environment, and here the difference of short and long run price 
elasticities is of great significance. The inelastic properties of the short run elasticity might 
frighten politicians while it is only in the long run that the environmental effects show up 
(Sterner, 2007). 
As Larsson and Sandin (2018) mentioned, a big part of the distributional factor is the 
geographical difference in price sensitivity of fuel. Nicol (2003) studies price elasticities of 
gasoline in different regions in both Canada and the U.S. Except from the finding that the 
regions in Canada seems to be more sensitive than the regions in the U.S, he also finds that 
there are differences between regions in the same country. Though, he emphasizes on the fact 
that the regional differences are small compared to the different household characteristics. Due 
to this, policy making should not only be based on the average elasticities of households (Nicol, 
2003). 
An important finding in the literature about regional differences of price elasticities, is that rural 
areas seem to be more sensitive to an increase in the price than urban areas. Bureau (2011) 
studies the effects of a fuel tax increase in France. Amongst the findings, richer households 
seem to be less sensitive than poorer households and rural households seem to get more affected 
than urban households. With no surprise, the worse-off seem to be the poorer rural households 
(Bureau, 2011). Blow and Crawford (1997) make a similar study on a tax increase but in the 
U.K. They also find that there are differences in how a higher cost of private transport affects 
different regions. Like other studies, they find that it is the poorer households, especially in 
rural areas, that are affected the most (Blow & Crawford, 1997). 
Pyddoke and Swärdh (2015), as mentioned before, study how the use of privately-owned cars 
varies in Sweden due to multiple factors, including fuel price. They also check the effect of 
living in an urban or rural area and finds that the lowest sensitivity is found in rural areas close 
to urban areas. This may be explained by people living in the rural area and working in the 
urban area. Individuals with lower income also seem to be more sensitive towards price, this 
might depend on the fact that transport takes up a bigger part of their total income compared to 
higher income individuals. Conclusively, car travel elasticity of fuel prices seems to decrease 
with income and is the lowest in rural areas close to urban areas (Pyddoke & Swärdh, 2015). 
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Eliasson, Pyddoke and Swärdh (2016) study the distributional effects of different tax 
instruments on car-use in Sweden. While these instruments usually are fiscally motivated, they 
are becoming increasingly motivated by environmental reasons. As many others, they note that 
there are widespread concerns of both regressivity and unevenly distributed damage towards 
rural areas when discussing fuel taxes. They calculate welfare losses by simulating different tax 
raises and implementations and they find that, while these instruments are on average 
progressive, they hurt the poor and rural residents disproportionately. They point out the finding 
that the geographical location of the area seemingly does not matter, but it is the type and 
function of the area that determines the sensitivity. In other words, it is the distinction between 
urban vs rural and not north vs south that is of importance. Another important finding is that 
the different household characteristics seem to be of big importance in determining the effects 
of a tax raise (Eliasson, Pyddoke & Swärdh, 2016). This is in line with what Nicol (2003) found 
in his study that was mentioned earlier. 
3.4 Price elasticities of gasoline in different regions of Sweden 
Studies on gasoline demand and its elasticities in Sweden are relatively scarce. SIKA (2008), 
which stands for The Swedish Institute for Communication Analysis, noted in 2008 that studies 
on price elasticities of gasoline on regional level in Sweden is missing, but is needed (SIKA, 
2008). 
Due to its closeness to our thesis, Dahlkvist’s (2016) master thesis must be mentioned. By 
dividing Sweden into six different regions, she succeeds in finding different “intermediate” 
price elasticities for all of them. Dahlkvist (2016) reports the following results of -0.63 for 
average of Sweden, -0.72 for major towns, -1.05 for Stockholm, -0.63 for southern areas, -0.38 
for urban north, 0.01 for rural north and -1.01 for Malmö/Göteborg. She concludes that rural 
areas seem to be more inelastic than urban areas which agrees with earlier literature (Dahlkvist, 
2016). 
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4. Theoretical Framework & Hypotheses 
In this section, the economic theory relevant for our research question and the hypotheses we 
derive will be described. 
4.1 Consumer theory 
Consumers are assumed to receive utility from consumption of goods. The consumers are 
considered to be rational, maximising their utility given their respective preferences and budget 
constraints. This can be described by a utility function (𝑈), which is dependent on a basket of 
different goods, 𝑥𝑛. This can be described by Equation (1): 
Equation (1).                                 𝑈 = 𝑢(𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛) = 𝑢(𝑥) 
When a rational consumer decides how much of a certain good to buy, there are different factors 
that their decisions are based on. With preferences and the consumers budget constraint 
(income) already mentioned, price might be the most important factor left. Intuitively, higher 
prices will most often result in a decreased consumer demand. This is in economics called the 
law of demand (Perloff, 2014). 
The budget constraint represents what the consumer can afford. You can describe the budget 
constraint with Equation (2): 
Equation (2).                                𝑌 = 𝑝1𝑥1 + 𝑝2𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝑝𝑛𝑥𝑛 
Y is the consumers income while 𝑃𝑛 is the price of the good 𝑥𝑛. The consumers cannot consume 
more than their income, which means that income restrains consumers from increasing its 
consumption and therefore reaching a higher utility (𝑈). In other words, the consumer’s 
objective is to maximize their utility, subject to their budget constraint (Perloff, 2014). The 
consumer problem is shown in Equation (3): 
Equation (3).                                      max 𝑈(𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛) 
                                               s.t. 𝑌 = 𝑝1𝑥1 + 𝑝2𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝑝𝑛𝑥𝑛 
A price increase of a good in the consumer’s basket means that the consumer, if choosing to 
keep the same type of goods in the basket, will have to reduce their total amount of goods 
consumed. The consumers could instead choose to change the composition of their basket of 
goods, buying more of the goods that are cheaper. This willingness to trade a certain good 𝑥1, 
for another good 𝑥2, is called the marginal rate of substitution (Perloff, 2014). Simply said, it 
measures the rate at which the consumer is willing to trade 𝑥1 for 𝑥2. This relationship is 
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explained in Equation (4), where 𝑈1 is the utility the consumer gains from the good 𝑥1, while 
𝑈2 is the utility gained from good 𝑥2: 
Equation (4).                                        𝑀𝑅𝑆 =  −𝑈1/𝑈2 
When a consumer can substitute a certain good for another, the goods are called substitutes 
(Perloff, 2014). In the context of our thesis, the best example for substitute goods are if you are 
going to use your car or instead use other transports, such as public transports. If the price of 
gasoline increases considerable under a longer period, you might decide to take the bus e.g., 
instead of travel by car. This is of course provided that the prices for public transport does not 
increase, or at least not in the same extent. 
4.2 Price elasticities 
How a price change of a certain good affects the demand of that good can be explained by the 
price elasticities of demand. Price elasticities are explained by the percentage change in the 
quantity demanded, in response to a given percentage change in the price (Perloff, 2014). This 
is shown in Equation (5): 
Equation (5).          𝜀 =
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
  =
𝛥𝑄
𝑄
𝛥𝑃
𝑃
=
𝛿𝑄 
𝛿𝑃
 
𝑃
𝑄
 
Here 𝜀 is the price elasticity, Q the quantity demanded and P the given price. The price elasticity 
answers the question “How much does the quantity demanded of a product change, in a 
response to a 1% increase in its price?”. That is, if the price goes by 1%, the quantity changes 
with 𝜀%. In this thesis, it is the quantities and prices of gasoline that are of interest. 
The magnitude of the price elasticity decides whether the demand of the good is unitary, elastic 
or inelastic. The interpretations of these is shown in Equations (6), (7) and (8): 
Equation (6):                               𝜀 =  −1 = 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐    
Equation (7):                              𝜀 <  −1 = 𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐    
Equation (8):                             0 >  𝜀 >  −1 = 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 
A unitary elastic demand implies that if the price increases by 1%, the quantity demanded 
decreases with -1%. Elastic demand implies that if the price increases by 1%, the quantity 
demanded decreases with more than -1%. If the demand is relatively inelastic, it implies that if 
the price increases with 1%, the demand decreases by less than -1% (Perloff, 2014). 
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There is also a difference between elasticities in the short and long run, especially in the context 
of gasoline demand. In the short run, consumers might only be able to choose not to consume 
as much of a good. Meanwhile, on the long run the consumer has more time to adjust, maybe 
by finding a substitute good or in some other way (Perloff, 2014). In the context of our thesis, 
in the short run consumers might be forced to simply drive less to consume less gasoline in case 
of a price increase. While in the long run they might be able to buy a less thirsty car, change to 
a diesel car or even to move closer to work. The duration of the short run depends on the 
scenario, i.e. how long it takes for consumers to adjust their demand for a certain good. In this 
thesis however, we will not derive short and long run elasticities. We will instead derive 
intermediate run elasticities, which earlier mentioned is something in between a short and a 
long run elasticity. 
We hypothesize that the demand for gasoline in Sweden is relatively inelastic to prices. As 
mentioned above, this means that a price increase of 1% would imply a demand decrease of 
less than -1%. This inelastic demand is assumed to exist because of a lack of substitutes and the 
relatively high income in Sweden. Regarding the difference across regions however, we also 
expect a certain pattern in the price elasticities, where the more rural regions have more inelastic 
demand than their more urban counterparts. As mentioned in section 2, the most important 
factors causing these differences according to us, would be population density, income and 
availability of substitutes of gasoline. While the more urban areas have a higher population 
density, this would imply shorter distances to travel and more options of transport modes. This 
could itself reduce the usage of gasoline. The much higher access to substitutes (e.g. better 
public transports and better infrastructure) in the more urban areas are also one potential reason 
for a higher price elasticity.  
4.3 Income elasticities 
As mentioned before, the consumers income act as a constraint on their consumption. We can 
measure how the quantity demanded gets affected by an increase in a consumer’s income, with 
the so-called income elasticity. Income elasticities are explained as the percentage change in 
the quantity demanded at a given price, in response to a given percentage change in income 
(Perloff, 2014). This is explained by Equation (9): 
Equation (9).                   𝜉 =
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
  =
𝛥𝑄
𝑄
𝛥𝑌
𝑌
=
𝛿𝑄 
𝛿𝑌
 
𝑌
𝑄
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𝜉 is the income elasticity, Q is once more the quantity demanded and Y stands for income. 
Income elasticities answers how much does the quantity demanded of a product change, in a 
response to a 1% change in the consumers income. So, if income increases by 1%, the demand 
changes by 𝜉%. 
Depending on what value the income elasticities takes for the demand for a certain good, we 
can define the good as e.g. normal or inferior. The income elasticity of demand for a normal 
good is positive, which means that if the income increases, the demand also increases. There 
are also different normal goods. There are necessity goods, which have an income elasticity 
between 0-1 and there are luxury goods, which have income elasticities 𝜉>1. As opposite to 
normal goods, there are the inferior ones. For these, the income elasticities take a value of  𝜉<0, 
i.e. negative. This means that for inferior goods, the demand decreases if the consumer’s income 
increases (Perloff, 2014). 
As with price elasticities, there are a difference between the short run income elasticities and 
the long run income elasticities. Though, as earlier mentioned, we will derive intermediate run 
elasticities, for both price and income elasticities. 
The income elasticities’ values are equally as hard as the price elasticities to hypothesize. We 
do however hypothesize that gasoline is a normal, necessity good, with an income elasticity 
between 0-1. This is based on several studies that have long run estimates around 1 and the 
short run estimates around one third of the long run. Pyddoke and Swärdh (2015) and Baranzini 
and Weber (2012) however, finds lower values for their income elasticities. 
We expect a pattern of the income elasticities, as with the price elasticities. Though, we now 
assume a pattern where the regions with higher income have lower income elasticities in 
absolute values. This hypothesis has it grounds in earlier literature. Pyddoke and Swärdh (2015) 
e.g. notes that individuals with lower income seems to be more sensitive towards price changes 
of gasoline. The reason for this is supposedly that gasoline expenses takes up a higher share of 
the budget for an individual with low income, than what it would to an individual with high 
income.  
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5. Data 
The data that is used in this thesis has been collected from three different sources. Prices come 
from SPBI (Swedish Petroleum and Biofuel Institute), the GDP-deflator comes from The World 
Bank and finally, gasoline supplied, income and inhabitants stem from SCB (Statistics 
Sweden). Ideally, a longer time period would have been studied, but due to limitations in the 
data, we had to confine to the period 2002-2017. Table 1 (p.16) presents all the summary 
statistics. 
5.1 Dependent Variable – Quantity of Gasoline per Inhabitant 
In this thesis, we are interested in the quantity of gasoline supplied to the final consumer, 
measured in thousands m3. The data is provided by SCB (2019) and is measured and therefore 
updated yearly at a regional level in Sweden. One variable that surely affects the quantity of 
gasoline in a specific region is the number of inhabitants. To remove the population-difference 
between the regions, the quantity of gasoline supplied is divided by the number of inhabitants 
in each region. This gives us our dependent variable, quantity of gasoline supplied per 
inhabitant, denoted by q. 
Overall, in the period 2002-2017, the gasoline supplied per inhabitant has steadily decreased in 
Sweden, as one can observe in Graph 1. This trend can also be observed at the regional level, 
but no region stands out from the pattern observed in Graph 1. 
Graph 1: Quantity of gasoline supplied per inhabitant, 1000𝑚3 - Sweden 
Source: SCB (2019) 
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5.2 Independent Variables 
Price and tax 
The price data are collected from SPBI (2019) and represent the yearly average price for 
gasoline in Sweden. It is measured in SEK/litre. SPBI (2019) has divided the price into four 
different parts; product cost, tax, value added tax and gross margin. Fuel taxes in Sweden is 
divided into two parts; energy and carbon dioxide tax. Further, there is also a value added tax 
that is added to the price. This means that there is a total of three taxes that directly influence 
the gasoline price. We will add SPBI’s tax and value added tax together and just call this the 
tax component.  
To get a good measure of demand, we have adjusted these values for inflation to get real values. 
This is done by dividing the values with a GDP-deflator collected from The World Bank (2019), 
with the base year 2010. By doing this, we have created the independent price variable, denoted 
by p, and tax variable, denoted by tax. 
In Graph 2, one can observe the evolution of both real prices and real taxes over time. As you 
can see, in real value, the tax has been quite steady compared to the price between 2002 and 
2017. The total real price has varied from the lowest value of 10.7 SEK in 2003, to the highest 
value of 14.64 SEK in 2012. At the same time, the tax has stayed between the remained values 
of 7.48 SEK and 8.18 SEK. 
Graph 2: Real prices and taxes in SEK, base year 2010 - Sweden 
Source: SPBI (2019) 
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Income  
The data for income is collected from SCB and represent the disposable income of households 
per inhabitant. It is the yearly average income, measured in thousands Swedish crowns. Here 
we have, as before, divided the values with the GDP-deflator to obtain the real values. This 
gives us the independent variable income, denoted by y. 
In Sweden, the real disposable income per household has increased steadily over the years, as 
can be observed in Graph 3 for the years 2002-2017. Income increased from 150 thousand SEK 
in the year 2002, to 193 thousand SEK in the year 2017. The time evolution of income for the 
different regions is similar to the entire country’s and no specific region stands out. 
Graph 3: Real disposable income per household, in thousands SEK, base year 2010 - Sweden 
Source: SCB (2019) 
5.3 Descriptive statistics 
The summary statistics in Table 1 display that the mean of gasoline supplied per inhabitant 
ranges between 0.00038 in Stockholm to 0.00062 in Jämtland. The region with the highest 
variation during the time period is Stockholm, which decreased the gasoline consumption per 
inhabitant from 0.00051 to 0.00021. This can be compared to Gävleborg which is the region 
with the lowest variation going from 0.00066 to 0.00042. In percentage, Stockholm is the region 
with the biggest decrease in their consumption, with 59%. Compared, Gävleborg is the region 
with the smallest decrease, with 36.4%. 
The highest mean of disposable real income per inhabitant is found in Stockholm at 1.9661. 
The lowest mean is reported in Gotland at 1.587. Halland had the largest income increase going 
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from 1.4988 to 2.012, i.e. an increase by 34 percent. Södermanland has the smallest increase in 
income during the time, starting at 1.4411 and ends at 1.8064, i.e. about a 25% increase. 
Gasoline prices and taxes are the same for all regions in Sweden. While prices are determined 
on the market, fuel taxes in Sweden is determined on a national level (Law (1994:1776)).
Table 1. Summary stastistics      
Region N mean sd min max mean sd min max mean sd min max mean sd min max
Stockholm 16 0.000377 0.00011 0.00021 0.00051 0.12628 0.01103 0.10718 0.14649 0.0782 0.0021 0.07478 0.08185 1.96614 0.17268 1.71083 2.18235
Uppsala 16 0.000475 0.00012 0.00031 0.00063 0.12628 0.01103 0.10718 0.14649 0.0782 0.0021 0.07478 0.08185 1.7066 0.14942 1.48726 1.88893
Södermanland 16 0.000536 0.00011 0.00036 0.00068 0.12628 0.01103 0.10718 0.14649 0.0782 0.0021 0.07478 0.08185 1.64402 0.12843 1.44115 1.8064
Östergötland 16 0.000477 9.7E-05 0.00034 0.00061 0.12628 0.01103 0.10718 0.14649 0.0782 0.0021 0.07478 0.08185 1.63685 0.14628 1.41809 1.82474
Jönköping 16 0.000549 0.00011 0.00038 0.00068 0.12628 0.01103 0.10718 0.14649 0.0782 0.0021 0.07478 0.08185 1.64946 0.15724 1.40656 1.85225
Kronoberg 16 0.000543 0.00013 0.00036 0.00071 0.12628 0.01103 0.10718 0.14649 0.0782 0.0021 0.07478 0.08185 1.64979 0.13642 1.42758 1.81557
Kalmar 16 0.000554 0.0001 0.00039 0.00068 0.12628 0.01103 0.10718 0.14649 0.0782 0.0021 0.07478 0.08185 1.60716 0.1529 1.37197 1.79641
Gotlands län 16 0.000601 0.00012 0.00043 0.00075 0.12628 0.01103 0.10718 0.14649 0.0782 0.0021 0.07478 0.08185 1.58699 0.15924 1.34891 1.79723
Blekinge 16 0.00055 9.8E-05 0.0004 0.00068 0.12628 0.01103 0.10718 0.14649 0.0782 0.0021 0.07478 0.08185 1.59017 0.13287 1.3835 1.76947
Skåne 16 0.000474 0.0001 0.00032 0.00059 0.12628 0.01103 0.10718 0.14649 0.0782 0.0021 0.07478 0.08185 1.70616 0.14676 1.48423 1.87976
Halland 16 0.000566 0.00014 0.00038 0.00075 0.12628 0.01103 0.10718 0.14649 0.0782 0.0021 0.07478 0.08185 1.78281 0.18394 1.49879 2.01198
Västra götaland 16 0.000489 0.00012 0.00031 0.00064 0.12628 0.01103 0.10718 0.14649 0.0782 0.0021 0.07478 0.08185 1.7075 0.16242 1.45268 1.91643
Värmland 16 0.00056 0.00012 0.00038 0.00072 0.12628 0.01103 0.10718 0.14649 0.0782 0.0021 0.07478 0.08185 1.61174 0.151 1.37137 1.81438
Örebro 16 0.000498 0.00011 0.00033 0.00064 0.12628 0.01103 0.10718 0.14649 0.0782 0.0021 0.07478 0.08185 1.60219 0.13391 1.39503 1.76972
Västmanland 16 0.000509 9.9E-05 0.00034 0.00064 0.12628 0.01103 0.10718 0.14649 0.0782 0.0021 0.07478 0.08185 1.66413 0.14766 1.44115 1.8503
Dalarna 16 0.000595 0.00012 0.00041 0.00076 0.12628 0.01103 0.10718 0.14649 0.0782 0.0021 0.07478 0.08185 1.62198 0.1496 1.39503 1.82336
Gävleborg 16 0.000554 8.4E-05 0.00042 0.00066 0.12628 0.01103 0.10718 0.14649 0.0782 0.0021 0.07478 0.08185 1.60646 0.13665 1.3835 1.78743
Västernorrland 16 0.000564 0.00012 0.00038 0.0007 0.12628 0.01103 0.10718 0.14649 0.0782 0.0021 0.07478 0.08185 1.62931 0.14571 1.40656 1.81438
Jämtland 16 0.000619 0.00014 0.00041 0.0008 0.12628 0.01103 0.10718 0.14649 0.0782 0.0021 0.07478 0.08185 1.60121 0.14802 1.37197 1.80539
Västerbotten 16 0.000485 9.8E-05 0.00034 0.00062 0.12628 0.01103 0.10718 0.14649 0.0782 0.0021 0.07478 0.08185 1.5896 0.14942 1.34891 1.78743
Norrbotten 16 0.000526 9.3E-05 0.00038 0.00066 0.12628 0.01103 0.10718 0.14649 0.0782 0.0021 0.07478 0.08185 1.65607 0.17087 1.39503 1.88623
Gasoline supplied per inhabitant Real prices Real taxes Real income
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6. Methodology 
In this section, we will describe and justify the models we have chosen and the econometric 
approaches we have taken.  
6.1 Models 
We have chosen static log linear equation models to derive the elasticities. These models are 
chosen due to their simplicity. There are of course drawbacks of simplicity, one is that static 
models do not derive both short and long run elasticities. For this, one would need a dynamic 
model. Instead, static models derive something close to intermediate run elasticities (Dahl & 
Sterner, 1991). Even if an intermediate run is not optimal to see how elasticities will change 
over time, it will give us the opportunity to compare the differences in income and price 
elasticities between the different regions of Sweden. Therefore, the static model will help us 
understand the potential heterogeneity across regions.  
By running an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with logged variables on both sides, we 
obtain the elasticities in the coefficients in a straightforward way. The first model, Model (1) is 
described below. 
(1)                                      𝑙𝑛𝑞 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑝 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑦 + 𝑈 
On the left-hand side, we have the logged value of our dependent variable, quantity of gasoline 
supplied per inhabitant (q). On the right-hand side, we have a constant 𝛽0, our logged values of 
our independent variables, real price (p), real income (y) and our unobserved component (U). 
The unobserved component (U) contains all the other factors that influence our dependent 
variable, and that is not included as independent variables in our equation. We are interested in 
the price elasticity (𝛽1) and the income elasticity (𝛽2) of the demand for gasoline. 
Model (2) is described below and includes the tax variable. 
(2)                                      𝑙𝑛𝑞 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑝 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑥 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑦 + 𝑈 
On the left-hand side, we again have the logged value of our dependent variable, quantity of 
gasoline supplied per inhabitant (q). On the right-hand side, we have a constant 𝛽0, our logged 
values of our independent variables, the real price (p), the real tax (tax), real income (y) and 
finally the unobserved component (U). Model (2) will help us disentangle the effect of the price 
from the effect of the tax on quantities, the price and the tax do not evolve in the same manner 
over time (refer to Graph 2). 𝛽1represents price elasticity, 𝛽2 represents the tax elasticity and 
𝛽3 represents the income elasticity of demand for gasoline. 
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To derive the results of an OLS-regression, there are certain assumptions that must be met. 
After some investigation, we concluded that precautions had to be taken with our variables to 
avoid violating some OLS-related assumptions. 
6.2 Multicollinearity 
We have reason to believe that we have a multicollinearity problem in our regression described 
in Model (2).  This will violate the OLS assumption that independent variables should have no 
linear relationship. In Model (2), we have both the price p and the tax. Since prices include the 
tax, the information on the tax is stored twice, in two different variables. In order to solve this, 
we create the variable “price without tax”. We now use price without tax (pwt) and tax (tax) as 
variables instead. This will give us a better estimation on how the variables affect the quantity. 
This leads to the Model (3) described below with the same notations as before. 
(3)                                𝑙𝑛𝑞 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑤𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑥 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑦 + 𝑈 
6.3 Stationarity 
Since we run regressions for each region, our data is in a time series format. A basic assumption 
about time series data is that it needs to be stationary. Time series are often non-stationary. It is 
indeed often the case that series, such as income, have a linear or exponential time trend. This 
will cause the mean, variance and autocorrelation to change over time. To control that our 
variables are stationary, we use the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. But, before the ADF 
test can be run, we need to choose which lags to include in the test. A lag is a past value of the 
variable in question and is used to take historical factors that may cause present differences in 
the endogenous variable, into account (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2016). According to 
Wooldridge (2012), there are no hard rules to follow when choosing lags for the ADF test. 
When using annual data one or two lags should suffice, Woolridge (2012) states. For every lag 
you include, one observation is lost. 
Complementary to Wooldridge’s (2012) notion to use one or two lags when using annual data, 
we have used the STATA command varsoc. This gives us information on which optimal lag 
orders to put in the ADF test (STATA, 2019).  
When the ADF test does not reject the null hypothesis that our series is non-stationary, which 
we will often observe in our results, we differentiate our non-stationary variables and run the 
ADF test again. When the test rejects the null hypothesis of non-stationarity, then we keep the 
level of differentiation and use it for our regressions. Differentiating allows us to remove the 
time trends or large variability, at the expense of the loss of one observation. In some cases, a 
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second differentiation was needed, which means two observations were lost. More information 
about the ADF-tests can be found in Appendix, where the steps of differentiation is shown.  
Model-wise, this means that we now have the differentiated version of some variables, which 
leads to new versions of both Model (1) and Model (3): 
(1)                                      𝑙𝑛𝑞 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑑𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑝 + 𝛽2𝑑𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑦 + 𝑈 
(3)                                      𝑙𝑛𝑞 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑑𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑤𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑑𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑥 + 𝛽3𝑑𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑦 + 𝑈 
Where d means differentiation and i gives the level of differentiation. The furthest 
differentiation that was made were to the second stage, which means that i only takes the value 
of 0, 1 or 2. All the ADF results with lag orders and chosen differentiations are shown in Table 
2. 
Models (1) and (3) will be performed for each of our 21 regions. The results will then be 
compared, and we will see if there is heterogeneity between the different regions.  
6.4 Pooled Time Series Data 
Because of the small number of observations that we have, pooling our time series data might 
give better results due to an increased number of observations. The cost of pooling our time 
series data is that now, we do not check elasticities for each region, but for groups of regions.  
The formation of the groups is based on population density. This is heavily influenced by the 
rural vs urban aspect of regions. We mean that the higher the population density, the more urban 
the regions are and the lower the population density, the more rural the regions are. The 6 groups 
we constructed are illustrated in Table 3. The same models, (1) and (3), that were used for each 
region are applied to the 6 groups of regions.  
One problem arose when grouping the regions together. Some regions had the same variables, 
stationary at different stages of differentiations. This meant that we had to differentiate the 
variables to the same stage, as to get homogenized results. In order to do this, we looked at the 
region in each group with the highest differentiation stage of the variable and converted the 
other regions’ variables to the same stage. When this was done, we verified that all variables 
were still stationary. In Table 4, the different differentiation stages of each variable for each 
group are showed.  
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Table 3. Population density.
Inhabitants/km^2 Group
Stockholm 353 1
Skåne 122 1
Västa götaland 71 1
Halland 60 2
Blekinge 54 2
Västmanland 53 2
Södermanland 58 2
Uppsala 45 3
Östergötland 43 3
Örebro 35 3
Jönköping 34 3
Kronoberg 23 4
Kalmar 22 4
Gotland 19 4
Gävleborg 16 5
Värmland 16 5
Västernorrland 11 5
Dalarna 10 5
Västerbotten 5 6
Jämtland 3 6
Norrbotten 3 6
Table 4. Differentiations of each group.
Group
lnq lny lntax lnp lnpwt
Stockholm 2 2 0 1 2
Skåne 2 2 0 1 2
Västa götaland 2 2 0 1 2
Halland 1 2 0 1 2
Blekinge 1 2 0 1 2
Västmanland 1 2 0 1 2
Södermanland 1 2 0 1 2
Uppsala 1 2 0 1 2
Östergötland 1 2 0 1 2
Örebro 1 2 0 1 2
Jönköping 1 2 0 1 2
Kronoberg 1 2 0 1 2
Kalmar 1 2 0 1 2
Gotland 1 2 0 1 2
Gävleborg 2 2 0 1 2
Värmland 2 2 0 1 2
Västernorrland2 2 0 1 2
Dalarna 2 2 0 1 2
Västerbotten 1 2 0 1 2
Jämtland 1 2 0 1 2
Norrbotten 1 2 0 1 2
Differentiering
Table 2. Results of ADF tests.
Region Diff Stationary Lags Diff Stationary Lags Diff Stationary Lags Diff Stationary Lags Diff Stationary Lags
Stockholm 1st 5% 0 1st 10% 0 1st 10% 0 0 5% 1 2nd 1% 0
Uppsala 0 1% 1 2nd - 3 1st 10% 0 0 5% 1 2nd 1% 0
Södermanland 0 5% 0 2nd 5% 3 1st 10% 0 0 5% 1 2nd 1% 0
Östergötland 0 10% 1 2nd 10% 2 1st 10% 0 0 5% 1 2nd 1% 0
Jönköping 1st 1% 0 1st 10% 0 1st 10% 0 0 5% 1 2nd 1% 0
Kronoberg 1st 1% 0 2nd 10% 3 1st 10% 0 0 5% 1 2nd 1% 0
Kalmar 1st 1% 0 2nd 1% 0 1st 10% 0 0 5% 1 2nd 1% 0
Gotland 1st 1% 0 2nd - 2 1st 10% 0 0 5% 1 2nd 1% 0
Blekinge 1st 1% 0 1st 1% 0 1st 10% 0 0 5% 1 2nd 1% 0
Skåne 1st 5% 0 2nd - 0 1st 10% 0 0 5% 1 2nd 1% 0
Halland 1st 1% 0 2nd 5% 2 1st 10% 0 0 5% 1 2nd 1% 0
Västra Götaland 2nd - 2 1st 10% 0 1st 10% 0 0 5% 1 2nd 1% 0
Värmland 1st 1% 0 2nd 1% 0 1st 10% 0 0 5% 1 2nd 1% 0
Örebro 1st 10% 0 1st 1% 0 1st 10% 0 0 5% 1 2nd 1% 0
Västmanland 1st 1% 0 2nd 1% 0 1st 10% 0 0 5% 1 2nd 1% 0
Dalarna 1st 1% 0 2nd 5% 0 1st 10% 0 0 5% 1 2nd 1% 0
Gävleborg 1st 1% 0 2nd 1% 0 1st 10% 0 0 5% 1 2nd 1% 0
Västernorrland 2nd 10% 1 1st 10% 0 1st 10% 0 0 5% 1 2nd 1% 0
Jämtland 0 5% 2 1st 5% 1 1st 10% 0 0 5% 1 2nd 1% 0
Västerbotten 0 10% 0 1st 10% 0 1st 10% 0 0 5% 1 2nd 1% 0
Norrbotten 1st 1% 0 2nd - 3 1st 10% 0 0 5% 1 2nd 1% 0
lntax lnpwtlnq lny lnp
Results ADF 
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7. Results and discussion 
7.1 Model (1) 
The results of Model (1) for each region are shown in Table 5. The price elasticities are as 
explained before, the coefficient 𝛽1, while the income elasticities are the coefficient 𝛽2. Most 
of our results are not significant, which may be because regions are to small subjects to study, 
or simply because we have got too few observations.  
Expected results were that price 
elasticities would have negative signs 
and that income elasticities would have 
positive signs. This model gave us 11 
(out of 21) regions with the opposite of 
the expected sign on price elasticities, 
which is more than half of our regions. 
It also gave us 8 regions with the 
opposite of the expected sign on 
income elasticities.  
At first, we thought that the few 
regions with variables that never 
became stationary, i.e. the variables lnq 
or lny, possibly could give us 
counterintuitive results. Shown in 
Table 5, there were also 
counterintuitive results for regions that 
had all the variables stationary though. 
Our expectations were also that the 
more rural regions would have lower 
price elasticities in absolute value, 
while the more urban regions would have higher price elasticities. This would be due to e.g. 
better public transport and a higher population density in urban regions. Following these 
expectations, the region of Norrbotten, which had a population density of 3 inhabitants/km2 in 
the year of 2017, would have one of the lowest price elasticities. This is while the region of 
Table 5. Estimated elasticites - Model 1.
Region Price elasticity Income elasticity
Stockholm 0.002584 -0.9913629
Uppsala 1.041702 9.562373
Södermanland 0.7748551 0.476398
Östergötland 0.8351482* 8.031755
Jönköping -0.1467519 -0.0708345
Kronoberg 0.1912416 -0.755609
Kalmar -0.0561964 -0.0396488
Gotland -0.5070495 -0.2861385
Blekinge -0.7407742** 2.325772***
Skåne -0.3459789** 2.604584**
Halland -0.0037245 -1.17155
Västra Götaland -0.1272212 0.2327262
Värmland -0.2438915* 0.0222004
Örebro -0.11985 1.147617**
Västmanland 0.0175092 -3.376763***
Dalarna 0.0817219 0.2943194
Gävleborg 0.0454181 0.0079265
Västernorrland 0.0606878 -0.0432455
Jämtland 5.505792 2.76962
Västerbotten 0.3288413 8.32108
Norrbotten -0.5192107** 1.50649
*** p<0.01
** p<0.05
* p<0.1
Elasticities - Model 1
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Stockholm, which had a population density of 353 inhabitants/km2 would have one of the 
highest price elasticities. As seen in Table 5, this pattern cannot be observed. 
With the price elasticities ranging from -0.7407742 in Blekinge to 5.505792 in Jämtland, these 
results indicate that a price change could have either a positive or negative effect on gasoline 
demand. The results also indicate that there would be big differences between regions. A total 
of 11 regions goes against our assumption that gasoline demand would decrease when the price 
increases. 
Magnitude-wise, some price elasticities stand out. Not only did we get some regions with 
unexpected signs of elasticities, but for Jämtland we even obtained a price elasticity as large as 
5.505792. Every region that has the expected negative sign, are found to have an elasticity with 
a magnitude that is closer to earlier studies.  
Our expectations about the income elasticities were that the higher the region’s income, the 
lower in absolute value the income elasticity would be. This pattern is not observable either, 
which can be seen if compared to the summary statistics in Table 1. 
The income elasticities stretch from -3.376763 in Västmanland, to 9.562373 in Uppsala. These 
results indicate that an income change could have either a positive or negative effect on the 
quantity of gasoline demanded. As well as the price elasticities, these results indicate huge 
differences between regions, with 8 of them going against our normal good assumption. 
With earlier studies reporting long run income elasticities around 1 and short run around a third 
of the long run, our results are hard to grasp. There is only a handful of regions reporting an 
income elasticity close to this magnitude. 
7.2 Model (3) 
This time we used Model (3), which meant we removed the variable p and instead included the 
variables tax and pwt. Table 6 shows the results of Model (3) on each region. 
The price elasticity, which now is calculated with pwt instead of p, gave us fewer regions with 
positive signs. Remember that negative price elasticities were expected. This time, there were 
8 regions that had positive price elasticities, instead of Model (1)’s 11 regions. This is in terms 
of our expectations, better results. But 8 regions with positive signs still seems like a problem.  
The price elasticities stretch from -0.6067756 in Gotland, to 0.3091678 in Kronoberg. As with 
Model (1), we get both positive and negative price elasticities. Both models now show that price 
could have either a positive or negative effect on gasoline demand. 
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Our expectations regarding the degree of urbanism are not confirmed by this model either. A 
pattern where the more rural regions have lower price elasticities is not observable. The 
magnitude of the price elasticities has changed though. With Model (3) implemented, the 
magnitude of elasticities has decreased, which can be considered as a progress. We now have 
no region that stands out, as we had with Model (1). This may be due to the variable pwt, which 
is described earlier.   
We also still obtain 8 regions with a negative sign on the income elasticity, which goes against 
our expectations. The expected pattern that regions with higher income would have lower 
income elasticities, cannot be observed with Model (3) either. 
The income elasticities now stretch from -2.54083 in Västmanland, to 16.04312 in Uppsala. As 
with Model (1), Model (3) also implies that an income change could have either a positive or 
negative effect on gasoline demand. The magnitude of the income elasticities is particularly 
large even with Model (3). With Uppsala as the region that stands out the most with an estimate 
of 16.04312, many of the results depart strongly from earlier studies. 
The biggest change from Model (1) to (3) though, is the inclusion of the new variable lntax. 
The estimated coefficient for this variable is called tax elasticity, which would explain how 
gasoline demand respond to a tax change on gasoline. This elasticity has the expected sign on 
all, except 3 regions. The lowest tax elasticity is -5.141532, found in Uppsala, and the highest 
0.5354161 is found in Jönköping. These results indicate that a tax increase has a negative effect 
on the gasoline demand. 
It is hard to say what magnitude we expected on the tax elasticities, given the lack of literature 
on this concept. Due to the correlation between tax and price, and the fact that tax regularly is 
included in the price, our initial thought was that the tax elasticities would be a lower version 
of the price elasticity. This is not what is observed in the results though. The tax elasticities 
became much larger than the price elasticities. This might imply that the tax has a stronger 
effect on the gasoline demand than what the price without tax has. 
Both Models (1) and (3) gave us contradictory results, to both our expectations and earlier 
studies. This makes it hard to say if Model (1) or Model (3) is better. Model (3) gives steady 
expected signs on tax elasticities and fewer positive signs on price elasticities though. 
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7.3 Model (1) – Groups 
Model (1), with the variables p and y, was now implemented on the groups mentioned in Section 
6.4. The results are shown in Table 7. 
With our data set now being pooled time series data, the results changed. The price elasticity 
estimates all became as expected, negative. Already, these results fit in better with both earlier 
literature and our assumptions. With the highest (in absolute value) price elasticity being -
0.3461439 in Group 1 and the lowest being -0.0016796 in Group 4, these results fit in quite 
good with earlier literature in other countries. However, Dahlkvist (2016) seems to be one of 
the few reporting intermediate run elasticities of gasoline in Sweden. As stated in section 4.4, 
she reports an average intermediate run price elasticity in Sweden of -0.63. Compared to this 
value, our numbers are lower. 
Table 6. Estimated elasticites - Model 3.
Region Income elasticity Tax elasticity Price elasticity
Stockholm 0.0816453 -2.346097** 0.2243475**
Uppsala 16.04312** -5.141532** -0.1970074
Södermanland 1.71098 -4.349394 -0.0015529
Östergötland -2.499722 -2.499722 0.0997871
Jönköping -0.3300677 0.5354161 -0.196339**
Kronoberg -2.173745** -1.152625* 0.3091678**
Kalmar -0.2157386 -0.3805515 -0.0224812
Gotland -1.498875 0.0290468 -0.6067756
Blekinge 0.6152392 -0.3690684 -0.2333655***
Skåne 1.666132 -0.5408015 -0.0865576
Halland -1.164026 -0.3538413 0.0106351
Västra Götaland -0.1023808 0.4607007* -0.1108302***
Värmland 0.422727 -0.8597898 -0.1246954
Örebro 0.5650455 -0.6875701*** 0.0104612
Västmanland -2.54083** -0.2740908 -0.1042736
Dalarna 0.0817219 -0.810582** -0.1257407*
Gävleborg 0.1319643 -0.1607166 0.0013814
Västernorrland 0.1563135 -0.0660199 0.0497372
Jämtland 5.505792 -4.365875 0.174873
Västerbotten 8.737743* -3.768944* -0.048872
Norrbotten 2.147552*** -0.7483606** -0.2184947***
*** p<0.01
** p<0.05
* p<0.1
Elasticities - Model 3
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When looking for our expected pattern of lower (in absolute values) price elasticities in more 
rural areas, our expectations are not all fulfilled. The groups are as mentioned in section 7.4, 
characterized by their population density. The higher population density, the more of an urban 
region it would be according to us. This implies that Group 1 would have the highest price 
elasticity, while the elasticity would get lower and lower the further down the list. The pattern 
holds until Group 4, with Group 5 having almost as high an estimate as Group 1.  
While the price elasticity now seemed to give more expected results, the income elasticity is 
still negative for some groups. This time there are two out of the six groups. With Group 2 
having the lowest income elasticity of -0.8409661, Group 5 has the highest at 0.8197569. When 
looking at the groups with the expected positive signs, we can see that their value is more in 
line with earlier studies. Recall that long run income elasticities are estimated to be around 1, 
while the short run elasticities are usually a third of the long run. These results, excluding the 
negative estimates for Group 2 and 4, are right in that area.  
The expectation of lower income elasticities in regions with higher income is hard to trace when 
having grouped the regions together. This is due to the grouping being made by their population 
density. To get a clearer picture of the income’s effect on the elasticities, the groups could be 
sorted by income. 
The results derived with Model (1) on our groups seems more justifiable than the results derived 
from implementing both models on each region, at least when checking with earlier literature. 
The lack of the expected pattern of more rural areas having higher price elasticities, is still there 
though. 
 
Table 7. Estimated elasticites - Model 1 - Groups.
Income elasticity Price elasticity
Group 1 (Stockholm, Västra götaland, Skåne) 0.11914 -0.3461439**
Group 2 (Blekinge, Halland, Västmanland, Södermanland) -0.8409661** -0.0737853
Group 3 (Örebro, Jönköping, Östergötland, Uppsala) 0.6248687* -0.0332402
Group 4 (Kronoberg, Gotland, Kalmar) -0.1979684 -0.0016796
Group 5 (Dalarna, Värmland, Gävleborg, Västernorrland) 0.8197569 -0.3227058**
Group 6 (Norrbotten, Jämtland, Västerbotten) 0.6737366** -0.116183
*** p<0.01
** p<0.05
* p<0.1
Elasticities - Model 1 - Groups
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7.4 Model (3) – Groups 
Table 8 shows the results of Model (3) for the different groups. Recall that Model (3) includes 
the variables pwt and tax, instead of the variable p.  
The price elasticities, which refer to the variable pwt instead of p, are all with the expected 
negative sign. The lowest price elasticity is found in Group 3, with -0.0126448 and the highest 
is found in Group 5, with -0.161306. These results, as with Model (1) on groups, fit better with 
earlier literature in other countries than when the models were implemented on each region. 
These estimates are even smaller than with Model (1) though, which already had quite low 
estimates for being intermediate run elasticities. As before, the pattern of lower price elasticities 
in more rural regions is not found.  
The income elasticities are different, but there are still two regions that have unexpected 
negative signs. This time it is Group 1 and 2, instead of Group 2 and 4 as with Model (1). Group 
2 reports the lowest income elasticity at -0.7106874 and Group 5 reports the highest one at 
0.9894844. Except for the two negative income elasticities, these estimated values are also in 
the expected area according to earlier studies. Note that all regions have different estimates with 
Model (3) than they had with Model (1). 
As with Model (1), the pattern of lower income elasticity with higher income, is hard to trace 
when having grouped the regions. Recall our notation from section 8.3, that the groups would 
be needed to be sorted by income instead of population density to be able to see this pattern. 
 
The tax elasticities when estimated for groups, continued to be consistent with our expectations, 
i.e., negative signs. The lowest tax elasticity is -0.0872338 in Group 5, while the highest is 
Table 8. Estimated elasticites - Model 3 - Groups.
Income elasticity Tax elasticity Price elasticity
Group 1 (Stockholm, Västra götaland, Skåne) -0.2273376 -0.237981 -0.0801511
Group 2 (Blekinge, Halland, Västmanland, Södermanland) -0.7106874** -0.4588179* -0.0702937**
Group 3 (Örebro, Jönköping, Östergötland, Uppsala) 0.5118527 -0.2686416 -0.0126448
Group 4 (Kronoberg, Gotland, Kalmar) 0.0362138 -0.2559053 -0.1528992
Group 5 (Dalarna, Värmland, Gävleborg, Västernorrland) 0.9894844** -0.0872338 -0.161306***
Group 6 (Norrbotten, Jämtland, Västerbotten) 0.6866843** -0.2650658 -0.0518564
*** p<0.01
** p<0.05
* p<0.1
Elasticities - Model 3 - Groups
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found to be -0.4588179 in Group 2. These tax elasticities are not as high as when estimated for 
each region. Instead, these elasticities are quite close to expected values, if we look at the tax 
elasticity as a part of the total price elasticity. 
It is worth noting that, with both regions and groups of regions, the tax elasticity is higher than 
the price elasticity. This implies, as noted in section 8.2, a strong negative relationship between 
the tax and quantity of gasoline. 
When the regions are grouped together, the models are still hard to compare. The expected 
patterns are not observable with either models, which would imply that they do not exist. With 
both models, the results show price and income elasticities that are in line with earlier studies.  
7.5 Further discussion 
Many of our results are counterintuitive, both against our hypotheses and earlier literature. 
Following will be a discussion of things that could have been made different, which might have 
given us more intuitive results. 
One thing that Dahlkvist (2016) does different from us, is that she uses expenditure data for 
income, where we instead use disposable income. According to Dahlkvist (2016), the 
expenditure data is a better predictor for consumption than what annual income is. This is 
intuitive, as income might be saved or invested. 
We have also divided the quantity of gasoline supplied with inhabitants. A more fitting 
denominator instead of inhabitants might be drivers. This would give quantity of gasoline 
supplied per driver, instead of per inhabitant. We also use annual data for the quantity of 
gasoline, which only gave us 16 observations for each region. More observed years, or even 
monthly data, to get more observations might be to prefer.1 
Following this thread, more information about household characteristics might be good to 
include in the models when deriving elasticities. Both Nicol (2003) and Eliasson, Pyddoke & 
Swärdh (2016) finds big differences in gasoline elasticities between different household 
characteristics. In our models, the only household factor that is shown is their income. Most 
likely, characteristics like e.g. number of children, number of cars per household and number 
of drivers per household, would have been relevant variables to include in our models.  
                                                          
1 We contacted SCB to see if there was monthly data available for the quantity of gasoline supplied in 
each region, but they answered that they did not collect this data on a monthly basis. 
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8. Conclusions 
In this thesis we tried to find the intermediate run elasticities of gasoline in each region of 
Sweden. We also attempted to find the elasticities for groups of regions in Sweden. This was 
made by running OLS-regressions with two different models.  
When estimating the elasticities for each region with either model, it is hard to find any specific 
patterns. Both the price and income elasticity estimates became counterintuitive for many of 
the regions. This meant that when using regions, none of the hypotheses could be confirmed. 
The most intuitive results were the tax elasticities derived with Model (3). These were almost 
exclusively negative.  
When using groups of regions, the results became more intuitive. The price elasticities all 
became negative, all in a range that are acceptable according to earlier literature. This meant 
that one of our hypotheses about the price elasticities could be confirmed. The expected pattern 
of more rural areas having lower price elasticities were not observed, which meant that this 
hypothesis was not confirmed. 
The income elasticities also became more intuitive when using groups instead of regions. 
However, there were still two of six groups still being counterintuitive with both models. This 
meant our hypothesis about positive income elasticities was not confirmed. The ones that are 
with the expected signs are though in an acceptable range according to earlier literature. The 
expected pattern of regions with higher income having a lower income elasticity were not 
found, which meant that this hypothesis could not be confirmed either.  
We ask for more studies on the gasoline demand in the different regions of Sweden, due to this 
being such a current topic. With the current debate about whether gasoline usage should be 
decreased by an increased price, the expected effects and implications must be studied. 
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9. Appendix 
Stationarity and ADF-test 
To test if our variables for the regions are stationary, we used the ADF-test as mentioned in 
Section 6.3. Here we will more elaborately show the results when the variables became 
stationary by being differentiated. To do this we will show the steps taken for one region, 
Halland. 
As we can see in Graph 4, there is a clear negative time trend in the logged quantity of gasoline, 
lnq in Halland. This trend will show a false correlation between our dependent variable lnq and 
our independent variables. The ADF-test requires trends to be acknowledged when running the 
test, this is done by including trend in the STATA-command. When running the test, if the null 
hypothesis that states that the variable is non-stationary gets rejected, we can conclude that the 
variable is stationary. If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, we are not able to exclude that 
the variable is non-stationary. This is also explained in section 6.3.  
With variables that we could not reject the null hypothesis, differentiation was needed. In Graph 
5, the same variable lnq for Halland that is shown in Graph 4, is shown at its first differentiation 
stage. The negative trend that can be seen in Graph 4 is not present in Graph 5. 
Graph 4. Trend of lnq for the region Halland.          Graph 5. First level of differentiation of lnq. 
 
When running the ADF-test on the first level of differentiation of lnq, we would now not include 
the trend-option. The ADF-test now gave us a p-value below 0.05, which meant we were able 
to reject the null hypothesis of a non-stationary variable. These steps were as mentioned earlier, 
taken for all the variables to rule out the problems of non-stationarity. 
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